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[L. A. No. 18401. In Bank.

May 10, 1943.1

ARTHUR H. ALEXANDER et aI., Appellants, v.STATE
PE~SONNEL BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et aI., Respondents.
[1] Adn;tinist~ative Law-.Tudieial RemedieB-'--Exhaustion of Ad~

minlStratlveRemedies.-Adtninistrative remedies must be exh.austed before one aggrieved by the rulings of an ad~inistratIve body may seek redress' in the· courts.
.
[2] ~ivn Service - Reinstatement-RemedieB-'--Prerequisites---Pe_
t~tion for ~e.hearillg.-Apetitionfor a writ of mandate' toreVle~. a declSlonOf the~ State Personnel Board discharging the
petitIOners fro~ ~ervice and for an, order (if reinstatement
wa.s p~operlydlslIl~ssed, wh~re. a petition for rehearing before
t~e. board ~ was not filed wIthm the time prescribed' by the
CIvil SerVICe Act, § 173 (c) (Deering's Gen Laws' 1937 Act
1404).
.
,
,.

APPEAL from a jlldgm~nt of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Emmet H. Wilson, JUdge. Affirmed.
Pro(leeding in ma~dllmus to reinstate state (livil service
emp~oy:es and to r~qU1re paym~n~ of back salaries. Judgment
of dIsmIssal ~O~OWlI~g the s'llstammg of a demurrer to a fourth
amend.ed petItIon WIthout leave to amend, affirmed.
Holbrook & Tarr, W. Sumner Holbrook Jr. and L R
Tarr for Petitioners.
" . .
Earl Warren, Aitorney General,and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents.
~ ....
.~'-"'" .---:~. ~.

-

---

S:S;E.NK, J.-Appeal from a judgment entered on an order

sus~a.mmg . the respondents·' demurrer to the fourth amended

petItIOn WIthout .leave to amend.
The pet.itio:qers,AJexander and Sturzenacker, applied to
the SuperIor Courtm Los Angeles County for the writ of
[2] See 3 Oal.Ju:f. Ten-year SuPp. (PocketPal't) Ci '1 S .
. '
, VI erVICe,
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Administrative Law' [2] C' il S
ice, § 14.
'
IV
erv-

§ 11; 10 Am.Jur. 930.

mandate directing the State Personnel Board and, the State
Land Commission to reinstate them respectively as Petrole'1,llll
Production Inspector for the Division of State Lands, and
Chief of the Division of State Lands, Department of Finance,
from· which it was alleged they were wrongfUlly distti:issed~,'
and to pay to them back salary from the date of suspension~
Complaints charging the petitioners with incompetency and
misconduct were filed with the State Personnel Board on
July 12, 1938. Suspension occurred on' August 23, 19~8.
Heat:ings were commenced on September 26, 1938. A copy of
the board's findings, conclusions' and decision' dismissing the
petitioners was mailed
their counsel on April 8, 1939, and
was received two days later. The decision was entered on the'
roster of state employees on April 11, 1939, and in the minutes of the board on April 21. Thepetition for the writof
mandate was filed on July 5, 1939. On September 11, 1939,
the petitioners filed with the board a petition for rehearing
which was denied.
The petitioners allege that the conduct· of the proceedings
was irregular; that the members of the board were disqualified by bias, and that by certain utterances one member
had prejudged the petitioners' causes.
The trial court sustained the demurrer on the sole ground
that the petitioners could not state a cause for relief because
application for rehearing by the board had not been made
withmthe. time prescribed by the State Civil Service Act
and prior to the filing of the petition for relief in the courts.
Section 173(c) of the Civil Service Act (Stats. 1937,
p. 2085; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 1404) provides that
within thirty days from and after receipt by him of a. copy
of the board's decision, the employee or the appointing power
may apply for a rehearing.
The time within which the petitioners could have applied
for a rehearing expired before the petition for the writ of
mandate was filed in the superior court, and the belated application for a rehearing made in September following was
ineffective. The petition for the writ of mandate was otherwise filed within the time prescribed by the Civil Service Act.
[1] The rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted before redress may be had in the courts is established
in this state. (Abelleira v. District Oourt of Appeal" 17 Cal.
2d 280 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R 715], and cases cited at

to

,
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pages 292, 293, 302.) The provision for a rehearing is U1..questionably such a remedy. As to the general rule, it is
stated in Vandalia Railroad 00. v. Public Service Oommission of Indiana, 242 U.S. 255 [37 S.Ct. 93, 61 L.Ed. 276],
at page 261, that one aggrieved by the rulings of an adminis..,
trative board may not complain that he has been deprived
1)£ constitutional rights if he has not availed himself of the
remedies prescribed for a rectification of such rulings.
[2] The petitioners ask this court to distingu :.sh between
a provision in a statute which requires the filing of a petition. for rehearing before an administrative' board as a condi.
tion precedent to commencing proceedings in the courts, (see
Oarlson v. Railroad Oommission, 216 Cal. 653 [15 P.2d 859];
Albin v. Railroad Oommission, 216 Cal. 655 [15 P.2d 860] ;
Palermo Land &- Water 00. v. Railroad Oommission of Oalifornia, 227 F. 708), and a provision such as in the present
act which it is claimed is permissive only. The distinction
is of no assistance to the petitioners under the rule. If a
rehearing is available it is an administrative remedy to which
the petitioners must first resort in order to give the board
an opportunity to correct any mistakes it may have made.
As noted in the Abelleira case, supra, at page 293, the rule must
be enforced uniformly by the courts. Its enforcement is not a
matter of judicial discretion. It is true, the CivIl Service
Act does not expressly require that application for a rehearingbe made asa condition precedent to redress in the courts.
~ut neither does the act expressly designate a specific remedy
,In the courts. So that where, as here, the act provides for a
rehearing, but makes no provision for specific redress in the
courts and resort to rehearing as a condition precedent, the
rule of exhaustion of administrative remedIes supplies the
omission. The facts here alleged do not bring the case within
any possible exception to the enforcement of· the rule. Adh<lrence to the rule is not excused in this case because of the
bare ~robability,. ass.erted long after the time had expired,
that tImely applIcatIon for rehearing would have been denied. As suggeSted in Red River Broadcasting 00. v. Federal
Oommunications Oom., 98 F.2d 282, the petitioners cannot be
heard to urge that there was danger of refusal of their application when they did not make the effort within the time prescribed.
We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that
the petitioners were not entitled to prosecute the present pro-
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ceeding because they had not first exhausted. the available
remedies before the State Personnel Board.
The judgment is affirmed.
Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J. pro t~m., concurred.
Gibson, C. J., did not participate herein.
CARTER, J.-I dissent; The majority op,inion e:rlends.the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. far beyond
my conception of what the rule should be in view of the lack
of uniformity in the rules of procedure applicable to the' va~
rious adniinistrative agencies established under. the law of
this state. It seems to me more consonant with .principles
applicable to procedure before judicial and quasi-judicial
tribunals that unless application for a' reheapn'g is made
mandatory by statute or rule, such application need not be
made as a condition precedent to a review of the, decision or
order of such tribunal. Such is the rule with respect to
proceedings before judicial tribunals. That is, it :is not now
necessary to make a motion for a new trial in a trial court
before prosecuting an appeal· froil'ia judgment of that court;
neither is it necessary to petition. a District Court of Appeal
for a rehearing before petitioning the Supreme Court for a'
hearing after decision rendered' by such District Court of
Appeal.
,
The Legislature has by 'express statutory provision m~d~
mandatory a petition for rehearing before a party dissatisfied
with the decision of the Railroad Commission (secs.66-67,
Act .6386 Gen. Laws) or InduStrial Accident Commission
(secs. 5900-5910, Labor Code) may petition the Suprem~
Court for a review of the decision ()feither of said eom:triis·,
sions. If it were the law that a petition for rehearing were'
indispensable before such review coUld be had, the mandatory:
statutory. provisions applicable to the Railroad. Commission:
and Industrial Accident Commission are mere surplusage. .
The provision of the State Civil Service Act construed ili"
the majority opinion is subdivision (c) of section 173 and
reads as follows:
'
.
.
.
" (c) Rehearing. Within thirty dayS from and after re~
ceipt by him of a copy of the deCIsion rendered by the board)
in a proceeding under this section, the employee or the fl.P~:
.'

I

.

",.,l
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pointing power may apply for a rehearing by filing with the
board a petition in writing therefor. Within thirty days
after such filing the board shall cause notice thereof to be
served upon the other parties to the proceedings by mailing to
each a copy of the petition for rehearing, in the same manner as in this act prescribed for the giving of notice of a
hearing. Within sixty days after the service' of such notice
of the filing of the petition for rehearing, the board shall
either grant or deny the petition, and if the petition for
rehearing is not granted within said period, it shall be
deemed denied. If the petition for a rehearing' is granted,
the matter shall be set down for heal'ingby the board, either
b'efore the board or before its authorized representative, and
such' hearing shall be conducted in substantially the same
manner and under like rules "Of procedure as an original
hearing upon charges filed under and pursuant to the provisions of this section." (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the statute uses the permissive
, "may" instead of the mandatory "shall" or "must" in providing that either the employee or the appointing power may
petition for a rehearing. It is true that the Civil Service Act
does not provide for a judicial review of the decisions of the
Personnel Board, but section 52 of the act creates a statute
of limitation on actions or proceedings brought to obtain' a
"legal remedy for wrongs or grievances based on or related
to any civil service law in this State or the administration
thereof. " This section provides that no person seeking a
legal remedy under this act shall be compensated for the
time subsequent to the date when his action or proceeding
arose unless such action or proceeding is filed and served
'within ninety days after the same arose.
In the case at bar petitioners were suspended from their
civil service positions by the State Land Commission, the
employing body, on August 2, 1938, pending the hearing on
the charges against them before the Personnel Board. The
decision of the Personnel Board finding the petitioners guilty
of the charges was not mailed to petitioners' counsel until
April 8, 1939. The present action was filed in the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County on July 15, 1939. Conceding
that petitioners could not have commenced their action to
obtain a legal remedy for redress of their alleged wrong or
grievance until after receiving notice of the decision of the
Personnel Board, it appears from a reading of the provision
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above quoted pertaining to rehearings that had ~ey bee~
required to petition for a rehearing beforecommenclllg theIr
action it would have been possible for at least 120 days to,
elapse from the date of the decision of, the Pers?nnel Boa~d
before such action could be commenced. ObVl?usly; th~lr
cause of action arose when the Personnel Board rendered Its
decision sustaining the charges against them, a:nd' had; they
filed a petition for a rehearing and been required to walt 120
days before commencing their action,' it is probable, that they'
would now be met with the contention that their action ~as
commenced too late to enable them to recover compensatIon
for the time subsequent to the date when their caus~ of, action
arose.
.
.
..
t"h t
The obvious purpose of the LegIslature III reqUIrIng a
an action be commenced within ninety days after the cause
of action arose to permit the employee to recover compensation for the time subsequent thereto, was to prevent the accumulation of large salary claims for employees who had been
illegally suspended or separated from the~r emplo~ent, II;lld
to my mind it is highly improbable that It was the lllte~t~on
of the Legislature to' require the employee ~o file, a ~etltlOn
for lit rehearing with the prospects of not belllg pe~lt.ted to
commence his action within 120 days after the deCISIon of
the Personnel Board. Such interpretation of the statute is
to my mind unreasonable and contrary to recognized rul~
of statutory construction. I -could not better state my attItude toward the present statute as applied to this case than
in the language of the pre.sent Chief Justice of the United
States in United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 [46 KCt.
513 70 L.Ed. 986], where he said:
.
',ZAll laws are to be given a sensible construction; and a
literal application of a statute, which would lead to absurd
consequences should be avoided ~henever. a reasona?le ~p
plication can be given to it, consIstent WIth the legIslatIve
purpose. " ,
'
. ,.
For the foregoing reasons I am convmced that petItIoners
were not required to petition for a rehearing before the Personnel Board before commencing their action in the superior
-court to obtain a review of the decision of said board. and
therefore the judgment of dismissal entered on the order of
the trial court sustaining a demurrer to their petition without leave to amend on this ground should be reversed.
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TRAYNOR, J.-l dissent. The majority opinion holds
that' applications for administrative rehearings permitted by
statute but not expressly required as a condition precedent"
to redress in the courts, are in effect required by' the rule
calling for exhaustion of administrative remedies. At the
same time it acknowledges the possibility of exceptions where
a rehearing would not constitute an adequate remedy, thus
introducing a perennial question for litigation, and judicial
determination. Determinations might prove necessary not
only for each administrative body,in the state but for each
new question that arose before it.
Such litigation could be avoided by an unequivocal rule
that applications for reheari:J;lg permitted by statute are invariably compulsory before resort to the courts. So inflexible a rule, however, would take no account of the endless
'variations in the administrative bodies throughout, tht'l.state.
They vary in accessibility, formality of procedure, regularity
of meetings, personnel, volume of work, the making and keeping of records, and dispatch of business. Situations cOnstantly arise where one or more of these factors would make
it impossible for an administrative rehearing to be an adequate remedy. To demand compliance with an administrative, determination pending such a hearing might work great
hardship, as in the case of suspension of licenses. On the
other hand, to postpone compliance until the decision following rehearing might work great harm, as in the case of the
continuation of practices inimical to public health and morals.
It is my opinion that there is greater wisdom in the rule
that applications for administrative rehearings are not prerequisite to judicial remedies unless so prescribed by statute.
(Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43, 48
[43 S.Ct. 466, 67 L.Ed.853] ; Banton v. Belt Line Ry. Corp.,
268 U;S. 413, 416 [45 S.Ct. 584; 69 L.Ed. 1020]; United
States v. Abilene & So. By. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 282 [44 S.Ct.
565,68 L.Ed. 1016] ; Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. Blease,
~2 F.2d 463, 465; Pender Oountyv. Garysburg Mfg. 00.,50
F,2d 732; Canadian River Gas Co. v. Terrell, 4 F.Supp. 222;
see Birch' v. Oounty of Orange, 186 Cal. 736, 742-745 [200
P. 647].) Under such a rule the Legislature, to which the
task appropriately falls, would select the administrative bodies
whose functions and procedure insure the fitness of a requirement that applications for rehearing precede resort to the
courts. In this wise it has already selected the Railroad Com:

May 1943]

HUNSTOCB;

V.

ESTATE l)EVELOPM1!:NT CORP. 205

mission (Public Utilities Act, sec. 66) and the Industrial Accident Commission (Labor Code, sec;,' 590i). (Cartson v.
Railroad Oommission, 216 Cal. 653 [15 P.2d 8.59); Albin V~
Railroad Oommission, 216 Cal., 655J15 P.2d860];.Palmero
Land & Water 00. v. Railroad Oommission of California, 227
F. 708.) There.is nothing in Abelleira v.Districf Oourt'of
Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d280[109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R.7151; that
would preclude the adoption of such a rule., That case was,
concerned, not with the rehearing qu~!!tioIl, but, with theap~
plica.tion of the general rule of exhaustion of. remedies to the
prosecution of an appeal to
commissiorifroIp an adjustmentunit.thereof. The casesapply~g the exhailStionofremedies rule "where, the administrative procedure prescribes a
rehearing" (p. 302) were invoked merely t() pispOse of'the
contention that the rule should not apply on the ground that
the commission's earlier decisions in similar' cases would
render appeal futile.

a

[L. A. No. 18244. In Bank. May 17, 1943.]
MAUD H. HUNSTOCK, Individulil1y and as Trustee, etc.,
Respondent" v. ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Process - Service-Mode-Delivery.-::-The wordll''by delivering;" a,s used in Code Civ. Proc., § 411, relating to service of
process on corporations, require personal service upon the
designated persons.
[2] Id.--,Servic~Private Corporation~Delivery, to, Agent, or
Secretary of State.-Inasmuch as the, word "deliver,f' in Civ.
Code, § ,373, mell,ns delivery by hand when used in:.;eferring to
semce on an officer or' agent of a dom,estic corp(!ratioD, such
word Ill,ust be given the same meariingwhen uS,ed in another
portion of the same statute in referring to serv~ce, on the Secre"
tary, of State in lieu of service on the corporation., Moreover"
in providing that service uppn the Secretary of State, may he
made by delivery of the process Dot only to hUn but, also "to
[1] See 21 Ca1.Jur. 492; 42 Am.Jur. 38.
[2] ,See 6A Ca1.Jur. 1382; 42 Am.Jur. 92.
McK. Dig. References: [15] Process; § 24;'[2-5,7; 8] Process,
§ 56; [6] Administrative Law.
'
.,
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